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Notes
Social Security Disability Benefits:
Three Current Problems
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The social desirability of and need for some kind of disability benefits under the social security system were recognized as
early as 1937 by the Advisory Council on Social Security.: In 1939
the Social Security Board first recommended that disability
benefits be added to the Act. 2 Similar recommendations continued throughout the 1940's. 3

The all-important definition of disability for social security
purposes was first proposed in 1949, 4 accompanying a cash disability benefits program which was deleted from the 1950 Social
Security Amendments in conference committee. 5 In 1952 Senate opposition killed a "disability freeze" provision which was
analogous to a waiver of premiums clause in a life insurance
policy, freezing a worker's coverage status for old-age and survivors insurance benefits. 6 It employed the same disability definition.7 In 1954, however, the "disability freeze" was enacted,3
but was limited by strict insured-status requirements. 9 The
definition of disability utilized was identical to the earlier proposals: "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental im1. See Social Security in Review, SOCIAL SEcLTy BULL., Jan.
1939, at 2.
2. SOCIAL SECURITY BD., PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE SOCIAL SECUIT ACT 7-8 (1939).

3. See, e.g., Altmeyer, Social Insurance for Permanently Disabled Workers, SOCIAL SECURITY BULL., March 1941, at 3 (written by the
Chairman of the Social Security Board); Altmeyer, Ways to Improve
the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Program, SOcIAL SEcuRiTY BULL.,
Dec. 1947, at 8, 12; 8 SOCIAL SECURITY BD. ANN. REP. 37-38 (1943).
4.
5.

H.R. 6000, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
CoNF. REP. No. 2771, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).

6. H.R. REP. No. 1698, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1954).

See 98

CONG. REC. 5471, 5473 (1952).

7. H.R. 7800, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).

See CoNF. REP. No.

2491, 82d Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1952) (deleted "freeze" because of insufficient time for full hearings).
8. Social Security Amendments of 1954 §§ 106(a)-(b), 68 Stat.
1079 (1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 413 (a) (2) (i) (1964).
9. Social Security Amendments of 1954 § 106(d), 68 Stat. 1081
(1954). Six of the last thirteen and twenty of the last forty quarters
must have been quarters of coverage under title 11 of the Act in order

for the claimant to qualify for the freeze.
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pairment which can be expected to be of long-continued and
.... 10 A complex administrative process
indefinite duration
for disability determination was also established. 11
In 1956 Congress expanded the program to include monthly
cash benefits to eligible disabled workers between the ages of
fifty and sixty-five.12 The monthly payments were to be reduced
if the claimant were receiving any other disability benefits or
state workmen's compensation payments.13 In 1958 supplemental benefits were added for dependents of disability beneficiaries. 14 The age restrictions of the 1956 amendments were
eliminated in 1960,1 5 but the contribution rate was left un10. Social Security Act § 216(i) (1) (A), added by 68 Stat. 1080
(1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1) (A) (1964).

11. Social Security Act § 221, added by 68 Stat. 1082 (1954), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 421 (1964). See STAFF OF SuBcoMM. ON T
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SociAL SECUrTsr LAwS FOR THE USE OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86Ti CONG., 1ST SEss., DISABILITY INSURANCE FACT BOOK (Comm. Print 1959); Rowland, Judicial

Review of Disability Determinations,52 GEo. L.J. 42, 48-51 (1963).
Applications for disability benefits axe routed by local district offices of the Social Security Administration, which screen them for coverage requirement compliance and proper evidence, to state agencies
which, under a contract with the Administration, decide the claim on
its merits based on standards set by the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare. The Administration may not revise a finding adverse to

the claimant, but may send it back for reconsideration. The claimant
is then notified of the final determination. If he objects to it, he is
entitled to a hearing before a hearing examiner, after the state agency
has an opportunity to reconsider. The claimant, if still unsatisfied with
the determination, may then appeal to the Appeals Council, which can
also take the case for review on its own motion. The decision of the
Appeals Council, or if it refuses to hear the case, the decision of the
hearing examiner, becomes the final decision of the Secretary. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.901-.981 (1966).

12. Social Security Amendments of 1956 § 103(a), 70 Stat. 815
(1956).

13.

Social Security Amendments of 1956 § 103(a), 70 Stat. 816

(1956).
Much of the early controversy concerning the disability provisions
was engendered by the 1958 repeal of this offset. Social Security
Amendments of 1958 § 206, 72 Stat. 1025 (1958). Fears were expressed
that the program posed a threat to state workmen's compensation systems. See Abraham & Wolkstein, Workmen's Compensation and the
Social Security Disability Program: A Contrast, 16 VAND. L. REV. 1055
(1963); Symons, Expansion of Our Federal Social Security Laws is
Threatening the Destruction of Our State Workmen's Compensation System, 29 INS. COUNSEL J. 379 (1962).
The offset, however, has since been restored. Social Security
Amendments of 1965 § 335, 42 U.S.C. § 424:a (Supp. I 1965).
14. Social Security Amendments of 1958 § 205, 72 Stat. 1021, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)-(q) (1964).
15. Social Security Amendments o: 1960 § 401, 74 Stat. 967, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a) (1) (B) (1964).
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changed.'0 In 1965 the disability definition's prognosis requirement of "or to be of long-continued and indefinite duration"
was eliminated. Substituted was the phrase "or has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
17
12 months."
The slow progress of the disability program from perennial
recommendation to the present general program of cash benefits
is evidence of the strong opposition that confronted the program at every stage. Opponents argued that it was merely an
8
opening wedge for socialized medicine;' that it was a foot in the
9
door for a runaway program; that it would bankrupt the old20
age and survivors insurance trust fund; that since benefits
were payable as a matter of right, loose administration was in16. The original payroll tax contribution rate was % of 1% on
employees and employers and % of 1% on self-employed workers.
Social Security Amendments of 1956 § 103(e), 70 Stat. 820 (1956). The
elimination of the age restrictions on benefits without an increase in the
contribution rate was a substantial factor in the decreasing balance of
the disability trust fund from 1961-1962 through 1965-1966. See SOCIAL
SEcuarry BuLL., Dec. 1966, at 41. In 1965 the contribution rate was
raised to 7 0 of 1% for employees and employers and % of 1% on the
self-employed. Social Security Amendments of 1965 §§ 305(a), (b),
79 Stat. 370 (1965), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1), (2) (Supp. I
1965).
17. Social Security Amendments of 1965 § 303(a) (1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 416(i) (1) (A) (Supp. I 1965).
18. See Rowland, supra note 11, at 43. The opponents objected to
any federal agency passing upon or prescribing standards for private
Proponents
medical examinations. 98 CONG. REC. 5471, 5472 (1952).
pointed out that realistically there must be some control over unduly
sympathetic or even dishonest physicians. 98 CONG. REc. 5473 (1952).
To give assurance that no socialization of medicine was intended, a
disclaimer clause was included in the 1954 amendments.
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing
the Secretary or any other officer or employee of the United
States to interfere in any way with the practice of medicine or
with relationships between practitioners of medicine and their
patients, or to exercise any supervision or control over the
administration of any hospital.
42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1) (1964).

19. See

ADvisoRy CouNcIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, RECOMMENDATIONS

LEGISLATION, S. Doc. No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.
89-90 (1949) (memorandum of dissent).
20. The old-age and survivors insurance system is on a sound
financial basis; your committee strongly believes that it must
be kept so and should not be altered by adding a benefit
feature that could have substantially higher costs than can be
estimated.
S. REP. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1956). In order to meet this
criticism, when cash benefits were first added to the Act, a separate
disability trust fund was established. Social Security Amendments of
FOR SOCIAL SEcuR=

1956 § 103(e), 70 Stat. 820, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1964).
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evitable; 2 1 and that the definition of disability was impossible to
administer. 22 As a result, a continual effort was made by the proponents of the disability provisions to design a "conservative
23
program" to meet specific needs and to answer these criticisms.
The Act's definition of disability was, therefore, conservatively
24
and defensively phrased.
Despite the fears of the program's opponents, the Secretary
has sought to administer the program in conformance with these
admonitions of conservatism. 25 The threat of loose administration and expansion of the disability definition which the opponents feared so much and sought so diligently to prevent has
arisen, however, from an entirely unexpected source-the federal courts.
The Act provides that when a claimant has exhausted his
administrative remedies, he may obtain further review by bringing a civil action in a federal district court.26 Judicial review is
an important and vital part of any administrative scheme, in
that it protects the claimant from arbitrary or unlawful adminis21. See ADvisoRY CouNcIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, supra note 19,
at 87.
22. S. REP. No. 2133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1956).
23. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1965);
S. REP. No. 1856, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1.5 (1960); H.R. REP. No. 1189,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955); H.R. REP. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.

30 (1949).

24. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1189, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1956);
S. REP. No. 1987, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 23. (1954).
See Rowland, supra

note 11, at 51-52.
25. It has been pointed out that this conservatism may be the
normal result of such a program.
The popular notion is that if ycu give public servants the
job of handing out public funds, i;hey naturally will be as
open-handed as they possibly can find any excuse for being,
since, after all, such largesse does not cost the administrator
anything out of his own pocket. But the present analysis seems
to confirm what practitioners before administrative commissions have often observed, that, whether it means money out of
his own pocket or not, the seasoned administrator in charge of
distributing public funds is capable of developing as high a
capacity for resistance to parting with money as any insurance
claim manager. This is partly because, when you have no
employer or insurance resistance, the entire burden of resisting
claims is thrown upon the administrator, and he is forced by
this circumstance to generate a defensive attitude on behalf of
the public to take the place of the missing private defense.
Larson, The Myth of Administrative Generosity: A Lesson from British
Experience, 40 A.B.A.J. 195, 263 (1954). See Longshore, The Social
Security Disability Insurance Program-An Example of the Necessity
for Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions, 25 ALA. LAW. 282, 283
(1964).
26. Social Security Act § 205(g), added by 53 Stat. 1370 (1939),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1964).
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trative decisions. At the same time, it was contemplated that
the courts would defer to administrative findings of fact and
reasonable inferences therefrom which are within the agency's
statutory authority and are supported by substantial evidence. 27
This "substantial evidence" rule is a very difficult concept to
define and even more difficult to apply.28 The two basic approaches in applying the substantial evidence rule in the review
of disability determinations have both been subjected to criticism.29 The directed verdict test requires the court to uphold
the administrative decision if the evidence supporting it is sufficient to support the denial of a motion for a directed verdict
had the case been tried before a jury.30 It has been argued, however, that this is too narrow a conception of judicial review, providing too little protection for the claimants.3 1 The "not a mere
scintilla, but enough evidence for a reasonable mind"3 2 test has
been criticized for shifting attention from the process of reasoning on the evidence in terms of legal standards to the character
of the verdict as the social judgment of a decent layman.3 3 As
has been pointed out, the temptation for the courts to let sympathy for claimants in disability cases sway their judgment
makes this test especially subject to abuse.3 4 Because of the
generally unfortunate condition of disability claimants, it is very
difficult for the courts to control their sympathies and confine
themselves to a dispassionate review of the record.
The three problems which have recently given the courts
the greatest difficulty in interpreting the Act's disability provisions are 1) the shift of the burden of proof to the Secretary and
the relevance of area job availability; 2) the role of pain in disability; and 3) the place of the so-called personality disorders
in the disability scheme.
27. "The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by

substantial evidence, shall be conclusive ...." Id. Therefore, it would
seem that the courts are authorized to set aside administrative decisions
which are not supported by substantial evidence.
28. See 4 DAvis,ADuRmsmAmvE LAW § 29.02 (1958).
29. See Rowland, supra note 11, at 60-62.

30. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S.

292, 300 (1939).
31. Rowland, supra note 11, at 60. See Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487-88 (1951), for Justice Frankfurter's careful
analysis of the delicate balance between deference to agency expertise
and review of the whole record on the basis of substantial evidence.
32. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Celebrezze v. Bolas, 316 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1963).
33. Jaffee, Judicial Review: Question of Fact, 69 Hv.L. REv.

1020, 1021 (1956).

34. Rowland, supra note 11, at 61.
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II. AREA AVAILABILITY AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
The Act provides: "An individual shall not be considered to
be under a disability unless he furnishes such proof of the existence thereof as may be required. '3 5 Thus, the Act expressly imposes upon the claimant the burden of proving that he is disabled.36 To meet this burden, the claimant must prove that he
is suffering from some "medically determinable physical or
mental impairment" and that "by reason" of this impairment, he
is "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity." 3 He
must do this by furnishing "such proof as may be required." 3 It
is certainly reasonable to infer from this language that it is the
Secretary who is to formulate requirements for the claimant to
meet in order to satisfy his statutory burden.3 9 These requirements must, of course, be consistent with the statutory definition of disability. Relying either explicitly or implicitly upon
this limitation, many of the courts have been unwilling to allow
the Secretary much freedom in this area, taking it upon themselves both to allocate the burden of proof between the claimant
and the Secretary and
to set out requirements for meeting the
40
respective burdens.

A.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE COURTS

While the federal courts uniformly pay at least lip-service
to the statutory requirement that the burden of proof of disability is on the claimant by requiring the claimant to introduce
some credible evidence to support his claim, 41 they differ widely
both on how much, if any, of the burden is then to be shifted to
the Secretary and on what must be proved by each. Based on
these differences, the courts can be conveniently classified into
35. Social Security Act § 216(i) (1), 68 Stat. 1080 (1954), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 416 (i)(1) (1964).
36. Id. "Except as statutes otherwise provide, the proponent of a
rule or order shall have the burden of proof." Administrative Procedure Act § 7, 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1964).
37. Social Security Act § 216(i) (1) (A), 68 Stat. 1080, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 416 (i) (1) (A) (Supp. I, 1965).
38. Id.
39. The regulations promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to this
grant of power may be found in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502-.1519 (1967).
40. See, e.g., Torres v. Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 342 (lst Cir. 1965);
Butler v. Flemming, 288 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1961); Kerner v. Flemming,
283 F.2d 916, 922 (2d Cir. 1960). Each of these courts, after conceding
that the burden of proof of disability is on the claimant, choose to ignore
that fact, at least to some extent.
41. See, e.g., Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964);
Kerner v. Flemming, 243 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960).
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three basic groups.4
An increasingly small minority of the courts, reading the
Act literally and showing great deference to the Secretary, have
required the claimant to prove a broad negative-his inability to
perform any substantial gainful work.43 The Secretary need
only, therefore, produce credible evidence of the claimant's ability to perform some kind of substantial gainful job in order to
deny him benefits.
Another group of courts has taken what may be termed a
"reasonableness" or "practicality" approach to what the claimant
must prove. Several of these courts have held that the word
"any" in the definition of disability must be read in light of what
is reasonably possible, not of what is conceivable. 44 Thus, all the
claimant must prove is that he is unable to engage in any job
that he could reasonably be expected to engage in, given his impairment, age, training, and experience. Others have simply
stated that the claimant's burden must be judged in a practical
need not
way,45 while a number have held that the 4claimant
6
prove his disability beyond a reasonable doubt.
The practical effect of each of these approaches, once the
claimant has sustained his burden, has been to increase, to a
greater or lesser extent, what the Secretary must prove. The
leading case, followed by all of the courts in this second group,
is Kerner v. Flemming.47 The Kerner court held that the
Secretary must produce evidence of both the claimant's residual
capacity for work and of job opportunities for someone with the
claimant's capacities to justify a denial of benefits. 48 Thus, the
Secretary must not only prove that the claimant is able to per42. One commentator found a sharp dichotomy between two
groups of courts on the question of who has the burden of proof of
disability. He concluded that one group places it on the claimant,
while the other group requires that the Secretary ultimately must prove
that the claimant is not disabled. Note, 63 MIcH L. REV. 1465, 1467-68

(1965).

43. E.g., Lamar v. Celebrezze, 354 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1965); Aldridge v. Celebrezze, 339 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1964).
44. E.g., Celebrezze v. Bolas, 316 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1963); Kohrs
v. Flemming, 272 F.2d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 1959); Klimaszewski v. Flemming, 176 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
45. E.g., Miracle v. Celebrezze, 351 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1965); Butler

v. Flemming, 288 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1961); Fowler v. Ribicoff, 197 F.
Supp. 508 (W.D.S.C. 1961).
46. E.g., Cyrus v. Celebrezze, 341 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1965); Thomas
v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964).
47.

283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960).

48. Id. at 921.
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form some substantial gainful work, but also that such work is
available for this claimant.
The third group of courts has gone even further in reducing
what the claimant must prove. The most that any of these
courts require the claimant to prove in order to establish a prima
faie case of disability is what he has done in the past, his inability to do it now, and his lack of training or experience for
any other type of work. 49 Several courts have required only
that the claimant prove his inability to do his former work,50
closely approaching an occupational definition of disability. In
order to deny the claimant benefits, the Secretary must prove
that jobs which the claimant can perform are available to him
in the general area in which he resides. 51
B. AREA AVAILABILITY
In a majority of the federal courts, the most crucial and controversial concept in disability determinations has become the
area availability of jobs. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
was the first to require the Secretary to consider evidence of
job availability in the claimant's general area. 52 The fear that
the disability program would become a de facto unemployment
compensation system if area availability became an element of
the Secretary's burden of proof prompted the court to back
away from this early position.5 3 The court, however, soon returned to the requirement that there must at least be evidence
of job availability in the general area in the record to support a
denial of benefits.5 4 Other courts, citing these Fifth Circuit
49. E.g., Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1964); Ellerman
v. Flemming, 188 F. Supp. 521 (WD. Mo. 1960).
50. E.g., Rosin v. Secretary of HEW, IA CCH

UNEMPLOYMENT

INs. REP. f 14,794 (9th Cir. 1967); Brandon v. Gardner, 377 F.2d 488 (4th
Cir. 1967); Haley v. Celebrezze, 351 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1965); Torres v.
Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1965).
51.

Id.

52. Butler v. Flemming, 288 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1961).
53. Congress might well have defined disability in broad terms
under the Social Security Act and related it to unemployment
by qualifying "any substantial gainful activity" with the words
"available in claimant's immediate working area" or similar
words. That is not the statutory test; the Act is not an unemFor the Secretary, "What
ployment compensation law...
jobs are there?" means, within the context of the Act, what
kinds of work can the claimant perform, not what jobs there
are available to him in Kosciusko, Mississippi.
Celebrezze v. O'Brient, 323 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1963).

54. Celebrezze v. Kelly, 331 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1964). The court
then went on to reverse the district court and affirm the Secretary's
denial of benefits.
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cases, have made the establishment of area availability an integral element of the Secretary's burden of proof,5 5 leading obviously to several problems of definition.
The first of the definitional problems concerns what is
meant by the phrase, "claimant's general area." In Celebrezze
v. Kelly,56 the court defined it as the geographical areas which
the claimant would normally be expected to consider if regularly
in the labor market.57 Its meaning, therefore, is subjective and
varies for each claimant.58 Most courts have accepted this definition, rejecting any concrete limitations in terms of number
of miles or of geo-political areas. 59 How far beyond his community of residence a claimant may be required to go to obtain
a job depends, therefore, upon his age, training, experience, residual capacities, financial resources, and family status.60 These
courts have recognized the fundamental unfairness of requiring
an unskilled, indigent, fifty-eight-year-old heart patient with
nine dependants to uproot his family and move halfway across
the country to get an available job. 61
55. E.g., Wimmer v. Celebrezze, 355 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1966); Hall
v. Celebrezze, 347 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1965); Massey v. Celebrezze, 345
F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1965).
56. 331 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1964).
57. Id. at 982.
58. Wimmer v. Celebrezze, 355 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1966).
59. Some courts have described the claimant's normal labor market in terms of his city or county of residence. E.g., Hodgson v. Celebrezze, 357 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1966); Wimmer v. Celebrezze, 355 F.2d 289
(4th Cir. 1966). While the claimant's county of residence is certainly
relevant, Gardner v. Stewart, 361 F.2d 827 (4th Cir. 1966), the court's
use of it to describe the claimant's normal labor market is merely a
shorthand description and creates no rule that the county of residence is
the relevant market in every case. Hilton v. Celebrezze, 367 F.2d 481
(4th Cir. 1966).
60. See Hodgson v. Celebrezze, 357 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1966).
61. See Boyd v. Gardner, IA CCH UNEMPLOYmENT INs. REP.
14,

773 (4th Cir. 1967).

Any test of disability which includes the concept .of area availability carries with it some element of fundamental unfairness. This is
illustrated by the situation in which two unskilled, indigent, fifty-eight
year old claimants with nine dependents and identical impairments
and residual capacities both apply for disability benefits. One claimant,
however, lives in New York City, while the other lives in the hills of
Appalachia. It is much more likely that the New York claimant can
find a suitable job which he can perform in his relevant market area.
Thus, the New York claimant is, arguably, discriminated against, since
he may be forced to work while the Appalachian claimant is granted
disability benefits. Faced with a balancing of inequities, the courts
must decide whether it is more unfair to require the Appalachian
claimant to move hundreds of miles to get a job or to require the New
York claimant to work while the Appalachian claimant sits back and
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The second definitional problem lies in the meaning of the
term "availability." Some courts have held that it means only
that jobs exist which the claimant can. perform. 6 2 However, many
of the light or sedentary jobs in society, both skilled and unskilled, are reserved by employers for long-time employees as a
reward for faithful service. 63 Still other employers refuse to hire
any physically or mentally impaired persons, fearing absenteeism
and increased insurance costs. 6 4

In many areas depressed eco-

nomic conditions have resulted in such a high level of unemployment that, although a handicapped person would normally be
employable, he is at the bottom of a long list in his own area.0 5
Even if a few jobs which the claimant can perform and which
he could likely procure do exist in the claimant's general area,
openings may be so rare that he would have no practical chance
of ever finding one. 6 Thus, many courts have concluded that
the mere existence of a job is not enough to constitute availability. These courts have held, therefore, that to deny disability
benefits, the Secretary must prove that a reasonable number of
jobs exist in the claimant's general area which he is capable of
performing and for which, in view of the employment policies
of area employers and the economic conditions in the area, he is
reasonably able to compete. 67 These courts do not require the
jobs to be open, 68 nor do they require the Secretary to act as an
collects disability benefits. The courts have generally chosen the latter
alternative.
62. See, e.g., Jones v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1964);
Celebrezze v. Bolas, 316 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1963); Graham v. Ribicoff,
295 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1961).

63. See Gardner v. Smith, 368 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1966).

64. See Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 546 (4th Cir. 1964).
But see, Richard v. Celebrezze, 247 F. Supp. 183 (D. Minn. 1965).
65. See Hodgson v. Celebrezze, 357 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1966). This
begins to approach a plan of unemployment compensation. Taking a
dim view of such a result, one court has stated: "The hardship seems to
be more in . . . [claimant's] inability to find employment than in his
incapacity to work." Hicks v. Flemming, 302 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 868 (1963). Thus, courts which have been willing to go far in expanding the definition of disability by use of the area
availability concept balk at considering adverse local economic conditions. McKay v. Gardner, 245 F. Supp. 739 (W.D. Pa. 1965). "Certainly if a claimant is possessed of skills known to be in demand in
another area, and it is clear that he could be there employed, he
should not be permitted to sit at home and draw rocking chair money."
Reagle v. Gardner, 261 F. Supp. 184 (D. Mont. 1966).

66. See Gardner v. Brian, 369 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1966).
67. E.g., id.; Cooke v. Celebrezze, 365 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1966);
Hodgson v. Celebrezze, 357 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1966).
68. Gardner v. Smith, 368 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1966). The court, still
worried about its retreat from area availability, Celebrezze v. O'Brient,
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employment agency to find a specific job for the claimant. 9
Thus, if such jobs exist and the claimant could reasonably compete for them the Secretary may, in his discretion, deny benefits.
In requiring area job availability the courts are trying to
prevent the claimant from being denied bread (disability benefits) because he has a stone (residual capacity to perform some
job which exists somewhere in the country). In doing so, however, the courts have refused to take the ultimate step and continue to deny the claimant bread (disability benefits) when he
has a boulder (residual capacity for some available but, at the
moment, filled jobs). This incongruity has been created by the
courts' desire to expand disability benefits as far as possible to
ameliorate the burdens of life 70 without creating a system of
national unemployment compensation for which, as nearly every
court recognizes, the disability provisions do not provide.7 1 However, no court which has adopted this broad availability requirement has yet upheld a denial of benefits on the grounds that
there were jobs available, but not open. Thus, the test may be a
mere smokescreen to hide the courts' creation of a system of
72
national unemployment compensation.
C. SH TNG

THE BURDE

OF PRoOF

The Secretary initially attempted to satisfy his burden of
proving the availability of job opportunities within the claimant's capabilities by reference to government job description
publications.7 3 After some short-lived acceptance,7 4 most courts
323 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1963), attempted to distinguish that case as
merely a rejection of the job-openings test but not of the existence-plusreasonable opportunity-to-be-employed-if-open test.
69. E.g., Hodgson v. Celebrezze, 357 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1966); Tigner
v. Gardner, 356 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1966); Celebrezze v. Bolas, 316 F.2d
498 (8th Cir. 1963). This is a statement repeated in nearly every case,
whether the area availability concept is utilized or not.
70. See Butler v. Flemming, 288 F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 1961).
71. E.g., Torres v. Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1965); Celebrezze v. Sutton, 338 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1964); Celebrezze v. O'Brient,
323 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1963).
72. There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with the creation
of such a system. If it were found to be socially desirable to create
such a system, it should be Congress and not the judiciary that does
the creating.
73.

DicTioNARY oF OCcUPATIONAL TITLES Am EsTIrviATE OF WORKER

published by the United States Department of
Labor.
74. E.g., Rinaldi v. Ribicoff, 305 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1962); Graham v.
Ribicoff, 295 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1961).
TRAIT REQUIEnMENTS
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have rejected such evidence as too theoretical or conjectural
standing alone to justify a finding of availability. 75 Testimony
of vocational experts as to the reasonable probability of the
existence of such jobs in the area has met with varying degrees
of court acceptance.76 In order to be safe, therefore, the Secretary in some courts must prove that employers in the claimant's
general area have in fact hired people with the claimant's capabilities or would be willing to do so. 77 It is possible for the claimant to rebut even this evidence by showing that he has conscientiously sought employment in his area and has been turned
78
down.
An increasing majority of the courts have shifted much of
the burden of proof from the claimant to the Secretary.7 9 There
are several sound policy considerations which may justify this
shift. The disability claimant is usually physically or mentally
handicapped, poor, and uneducated. He is about as ill equipped
to present a well organized and effective case at a hearing as
anyone could be. 0 The limits set on counsel fees for disability
determinations"' effectively preclude the claimant from obtain75. E.g., Gardner v. Stewart, 361 F.2d 827 (4th Cir. 1966); Ray v.
Celebrezze, 340 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1965). In Jordan v. Gardner, 1A
CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INS. REP. 1114,605 (7th Cir. 1966), the court held

that advertisements in the local newspaper of jobs drawn from these
publications was enough to constitute availability. This is, however, the
farthest the Seventh Circuit has gone in requiring some proof of area
availability from the Secretary.
76. Compare Dvorak v. Celebrezze, 345 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1965),
with Bugdenewicz v. Celebrezze, 249 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
77. In Cyrus v. Celebrezze, 341 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1965), the court
required the Secretary to actually question local employers to discover if they had any jobs which the claimant could perform and, if so,
whether they hired people with a restricted capacity similar to the
claimant's. In McKay v. Gardner, 245 F. Supp. 739 (W.D. Pa. 1965), the
court upheld a denial of benefits based. on the testimony of a vocational expert that persons with the same impairment and background
as the claimant had been successfully placed in jobs in the area.
78. See Bujnovsky v. Celebrezze, 343 F.2d 868, 871 (3d Cir. 1965);
Rachocki v. Gardner, 250 F. Supp. 317 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
1 79. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Celebrezze, 357 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1966);
Haley v. Celebrezze, 351 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1965); Torres v. Celebrezze,
349 F.2d 342 (1st Cir. 1965).
80. See Note, 63 MIcI. L. REv. 1465, 1472 (1965).
81. 20 C.F.R. § 404.976 (1966) "Representation before the Bureau
only, $20; representation before a hearing examiner and/or the Appeals
Council only, $30; representation before the Bureau and a hearing examiner and/or the Appeals Council $50"
If the case is appealed
resulting in a judgment favorable to the claimant "the court may
determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for
such representation, [by an attorney] not in excess of 25 percent of the
total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason
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ing adequate counsel, in terms of the amount of time one can
afford to spend in preparation. Thus, the claimant is often unable to sustain a rigorous burden of proof.
There is little alternative to requiring the claimant to prove
that he is suffering from a physical or mental impairment which
has reduced his capacity for work. The claimant has control
over all the essential information needed to establish these
facts.8 2 He is, however, usually unable to provide detailed data
on the local labor market. Therefore, if area availability is to be
an important element in the proof of disability and is to be established by use of such evidence, the burden of establishing it
should be on the Secretary. Unfortunately, the Secretary, given
the large number of disability claims he must process throughout the entire nation, is woefully understaffed for such an undertaking.8 3 Thus, it is often a practical impossibility for him to
come up with detailed, precise area job availability data for each
individual claimant.
D.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The reasonableness, on its face, of what these courts have
been doing has often obscured the absence of references in their
opinions to statutory language or legislative history which justifies either the shift of the burden of proof to the Secretary or
the corresponding imposition of the area availability requirement. The absence of references to specific statutory language
is understandable, since the Act expressly places the burden of
proof on the claimant,8 4 and nowhere in the Act is there any
explicit reference to area availability.
Most courts have relied solely on the familiar canon of statutory construction, that an act which is remedial in nature must
of such judgment. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (1) (Supp. I 1965) (emphasis
added). These provisions are designed to insure that the claimant and
not his lawyer gets the benefits to which the claimant is entitled.
They may, however, succeed only in impairing the claimant's chances
of getting any benefits.
82. See James, Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REv. 51, 60 (1961).
83. See Longshore, The Social Security Disability Insurance Program-An Example of the Necessity for Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions, 25 ALA. LAw. 282, 295 (1964).
'SBut to particularize that a certain human being with individualistic impairment and limitation may or may not have employment opportunity in a certain area ... may require a group of
soothsayers superbly trained to probe the many intangibles."
Stoliaroff v. Ribicoff, 198 F. Supp. 587, 591 (N.D.N.Y. 1961).
84. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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be construed liberally in favor of the claimant. s Most of these
courts, however, do not cite any language from the statute or from
its legislative history to support their conclusion that the disability provisions are remedial legislation, 6 although support for
this conclusion may be found in the legislative history. The "disability freeze" was enacted to prevent workers from losing their
old-age and survivors insurance benefits solely because they were
forced to quit work by disability before the statutory retirement
age. s 7 Cash payments were then added to provide retirement benefits to those workers who were effectively retired by disability
rather than age.88 It is clear, therefore, that the disability provisions were enacted to fill gaps in the existing social security system, and thus fit within the usual definition of remedial legisla89
tion.
In Gardner v. Smith,90 one couirt attempted to justify its
use of the availability requirement by reference to the legislative history. The court cited such language as "the impairment must be medically determinable and preclude the individual from performing any substantial gainful work .... ."91 to
determine that the word "preclude" is broad enough to encompass cases where the impairment makes impossible the obtaining of a job or being hired in order to perform the work
claimant is physically able to do. 92 This analysis indicates that
85. E.g., Hayes v. Celebrezze, 311 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1963); Butler
v. Flemming, 288 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1961); Klimaszewski v. Flemming,
176 F. Supp. 927 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
86. Instead, the courts cite a line of cases including Dean v.
Flemming, 180 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ky. 1959), and Little v. Department
of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Social Security Admin., 173 F. Supp. 276
(S.D. Mliss. 1959), which rely on Carroll v. Social Security Bd., 128
F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1942), which held that the Social Security Act "should
be liberally construed in favor of those seeking its benefits .... "
Id. at 881. This conclusion was based on the general statement of the
Act's purpose found in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937).

87.
REP. No.
88.
REP. No.

See H.R. REP. No. 1189, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955); H.R.
1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1949).
See H.R. REP. No. 1189, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 5 (1955); H.R.
1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1949).

89. The word "remedial," as applied to statutes, is commonly
given a very extended meaning, and made to include all such
as are enacted . . .to supply [sic] [remedy] the defects of the
existing law, whether arising from the inevitable imperfections
of human legislation, from change of circumstances, from mistake, or from any other cause.
Lauritsen v. Seward, 99 Minn. 313, 322, 109 N.W. 404, 408 (1906).
90. 368 F.2d 77(5th Cir. 1966).
91. Id. at 84, quoting from S. REP. No. 1987, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 21
(1954) (emphasis added).
92. 368 F.2d at 84.
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the legislative history may not foreclose the imposition of an
availability requirement, but it does not provide explicit support for such an imposition. Therefore, the court relied on the
to the claimant to
remedial intent of Congress and 9 fairness
3
justify the availability requirement.
Also available to the courts, but as yet unused, is an argument based on congressional acquiesence. The expansion of the
Secretary's burden of proof and the imposition of the area availability requirement have been going on for at least eight years,
yet Congress has done nothing to indicate its disapproval. The
courts might well rely on this inaction to justify both of these
4
trends.
The Act's legislative history provides support for several
strong arguments against the shift in the burden of proof and the
imposition of the area availability requirement. It is clear that
Congress intended the disability provisions, in their inception,
to be a limited, conservative program. 95 Subsequently, Congress has steadily broadened the scope of the program, 96 although
it has not substantially altered the Act's definition of disability. 7 Unless the definition, as drafted, has little intrinsic meaning so that its meaning is dependent on the scope of the program,
this history indicates that Congress did not intend to change it.
Since the disability definition seems to have been conservatively
and defensively drafted, 9 the reading of an area availability
requirement into it seems contrary to the basic intent of Congress.
Moreover, the House Report on the 1965 amendments to the
Act specifically stated that a claimant must demonstrate his
inability to engage in substantial gainful work regardless of
whether such work is available to him in the locality in which he
lives. 9 One court has dismissed this statement because it ap93. Id. at 85.
94. Cf. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
The argument based on congressional acquiescence is never very
strong since it requires the reading of a positive motive into congressional inaction. It is even less strong when the Supreme Court has not
yet rendered a decision on the question and the circuits are in conflict.
95. See materials cited note 23 supra.
96. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1965);
H.R. REP. No. 2288, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
97. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
98. See note 24 supra.
99. H.R. REP. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1965). Judge
Breitenstein, in his dissent to the adoption of that requirement by the
Tenth Circuit in Gardner v. Brian, 369 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1966), points
to this statement as an expression of congressional intent clearly opposed to the area availability requirement.
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peared only in the House Report and because the standard is not
availability in the locality in which he lives, but availability in
the claimant's general area. 0 0 This latter rationale is a flimsy
basis indeed upon which to dismiss the one specific congressional
pronouncement on area availability. The former, however, does
lend some support to the argument based on congressional acquiesence.
Any attempt to construe the Act's disability definition as
occupational runs afoul of very explicit language to the contrary
in several congressional committee reports which requires "that
the individual be disabled not only for his usual work, but also
"....
101 While no
for any type of substantial gainful activity .
court has yet interpreted the Act's definition as strictly occupational, those courts which have held that the claimant's burden of
proof may be met merely by a showing that the claimant is unable to perform his former work 0 2 come very close to violating
this principle. It is clear that Congress intended something more
to justify a finding of disability.
E. A PossIBLE SOLUTION
The two most obvious solutions to the confusion and conflict
among the federal circuit courts would not seem to be forthcoming in the immediate future. These problems and the inconsistencies in their solution have existed long enough for the
Supreme Court to have granted certiorari to provide for a uniform interpretation had it wanted to do so. The prospects of a
congressional solution also seem distant. Few Congressmen, as
a practical political matter, want a vote on their records which
can be interpreted as favoring a narrowing of the present scope
of the social security program. Thus, neither a specific clarification of the disability definition, to bring it explicitly into line
with the original congressional intent, nor a solution directed at
03
the specific problems the courts have been concerned with'
100. Davidson v. Gardner, 370 F.2d 803 (6th Cir. 1966).
See H.R.
101. H.R. REP. No. 1698, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1954).
REP. No. 1300, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1949).
102. See note 50 supra.
103. Since the courts seem most concerned about the inability of
older, uneducated, and untrained claimants to secure jobs, Congress
might well change the definition of disability to an occupational one for
claimants over fifty years of age. This would provide benefits for those
whose age makes them poor candidates for successful vocational rehabilitation. While the age limit of fifty is arbitrary, the other such
age limits in the Social Security Act are equally so. One attempt to
accomplish this change failed when it was introduced too late in the
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seems to be in prospect. A broadening of the definition to make
10 4
it truly occupational may not be a practical solution either.
Not only would such a basic change in the nature of the disability program encounter strong opposition, but also its proponents may not want to risk the build-up of more legislative history against the court's liberalization of the Act which a defeat
of such a proposal would engender.
Since a congressional solution seems unlikely, it is up to the
courts to formulate a test which is consistent with both the words
of the Act and its statutory history, and meets the needs of those
whom it was intended to benefit. It is clear that the burden of
proof of disability must be on the claimant. He must be required to establish that he is suffering from some medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which has reduced
his capacity for work. At the same time, it should be the claimant's duty to make a reasonable effort to canvass the relevant
job market given his age, training, experience, financial condition, and family status, in order to find a job. Not only should
the claimant be required to prove that he has, with reasonable
diligence, canvassed the relevant market for a job, but also that
he has been unable to secure one as a result of his impairment
and not as a result of the economic conditions of the area. If
the claimant would have been unable to secure a job, even if he
possessed the same capacity for work as he did before the onset
of his impairment, he has not been disabled by that impairment
within the meaning of the Act and must therefore rely solely
on unemployment compensation.
Once a claimant has sustained this burden, the Secretary
must, in order to deny him benefits, prove that a specific job is
available to the claimant. While in a limited sense this makes
the Secretary an employment agency for the claimant, this is
true only after the claimant has shown that he has exhausted
every reasonable avenue open to him to secure a job. He is,
therefore, truly unable to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by his own effort, so that, unless the Secretary can provide some sort of specific help for him, he is disabled within the
meaning of the Act.
session to get adequate consideration. H.R. 18008, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1966).
104. As has been pointed out, this would come very close to national
unemployment compensation and would involve a complete revision of
Congress' conception of the role of the disability provisions. See
Note, 63 MicH. L. REV. 1465, 1473 (1965).
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III. THE ROLE OF PAIN IN DISABILITY

A. IMAUM

NT OR SYMPTOM?

Another difficult problem with which the courts have had
to struggle is how pain fits into the Act's disability definition.
In order to guard against false claims of disability, Congress,
consistent with the conservative tenor of the disability definition, provided that an impairment must be "medically determinable" to be disabling within the meaning of the Act.10 5 The
Secretary, fearing exaggerated or fraudulent claims,10 relied on
this requirement to deny benefits to those who claimed to be
disabled by pain, unless there were objective clinical or laboratory findings in the record as to both the source and the existence of the pain. 10 7 Since it is usually impossible to produce
such objective medical evidence of the existence of pain in any
individual claimant,10 8 this approach would effectively preclude
the granting of benefits in most claims based on pain. For this
reason, most courts have been unwilling to accept such a strict
standard.
Several of these courts have required only that the source of
the pain be some objectively, medically determinable impairment.10 9 By treating pain merely as a symptom of this source
impairment, the statutory requirement of medical determinability is satisfied. The existence of the alleged pain and its effect
on the claimant may then be determined by the best means available. Many frivolous claims are still eliminated at the medical
determinability level, while many meritorious claims, doomed
by the Secretary's standard, are saved. The only major prob105. Social Security Act § 216(i) (1) (A), added by 68 Stat. 1080
(1954), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) (1) (A) (1964).
106. See L. MILLER & H. LIEBENSON, MEDICAL AND LEGAL EVALUATION
Or DISABILITY IN PERSONAL INJURY CASES

177-184(1962).

A number of

techniques used by physicians in an attempt to discover exaggerators
and malingerers are described in E. McBRIDE, DISABILITY EVALUATION
105-10 (5th ed. 1953).
107. The claimant's principal complaints are those of pain. In
such an instance, where the allegations of pain are inconsistent
with or out of proportion to the objective clinical and labora-

tory findings, the Appeals Council of necessity must give little
weight to these allegations in the ultimate finding.
Page v. Celebrezze, 311 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1963) (quoting from the opinion of the Appeals Council) (emphasis added). This position in modified
form is the heart of the present administrative regulation. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1510(a) (1966).
108. See J. BROOKE, BACK COMPLAINTS AND THE MEDICAL WITNESS
2 (1964); L. MILLER & H. LIEBENSON, supra note 106, at 117-24.
109. See, e.g., Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962);
Whittier v. Gardner, 263 F. Supp. 670 (D. Me. 1967).
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lem with this approach is that it may result in a frenzied search
in every case for some objectively, medically determinable source
impairment on which to hang the claim of pain, obscuring in the
process the necessity for determining the existence and effect of
the pain itself. No court, however, has yet overemphasized the
search for a source impairment or underemphasized the importance of the existence and effects of the alleged pain.
A number of these courts have pointed out that the words
"medically determinable" modify the words "physical or mental
impairment." Thus, in Page v. Celebrezze,"0 the court interpreted the inclusion of the word "mental" as a congressional recognition that modern psychiatric medicine "can find scientific
basis for the existence of real, distressing, and even disabling
pain unaccompanied by even the slightest organic defect."'
Therefore, if there is medical evidence based on the most modern
techniques of psychiatry that the claimant is suffering from
pain caused by a psychosis or psychoneurosis which prevents
him from engaging in substantial gainful activity, he is disabled.
Other courts have since expanded this approach to include pain
resulting from lesser but still medically determinable mental impairments."12 This acceptance of medical opinion as evidence of
the existence of a mental impairment indicates that these courts
no longer require objective clinical or laboratory findings, even
to establish the existence of the source impairment. Since the
Act does not differentiate between mental and physical impairments, there seems to be little reason why these courts would
not also accept medical opinion as determinative evidence of the
existence of a physical impairment." 3
110. 311 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1963).

111. Id. at 763.

112. See, e.g., Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1965)
(severe, chronic headaches may be enough for disability); Rosay v.
Gardner, 247 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Cal. 1965) (nervous problem of anxiety
or conversion reaction not a true psychosis). The inadvisability of
giving too much weight to current psychiatric categorization and tdrminology has been pointed out. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853,
860-61 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Burger, J., concurring). One court has even
indicated that severe hypochondria may be disabling within the meaning
of the Act. Mode v. Celebrezze, 359 F.2d 135, 136 n.1 (4th Cir. 1966)
(dictum).
113. The Secretary has tried to obviate this possibility by regulation.
Allegations of inability to work as a result of ... pain
...should be shown to result from structural, physiological or
psychological changes which can be identified by the use of
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1510(a) (1966). The Secretary's regulations serve only as
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Other courts have failed to explicitly recognize the sourcesymptom distinction. Finding it grossly unfair to deny a claimant disability benefits solely because of the inability of medical
science to determine the existence of pain objectively, these
courts have chosen simply to ignore the medically determinable
requirement." 4 Congress may have been unfair, but it did
write the ability of medical science to discern an impairment
into the Act as a prerequisite to the awarding of disability benefits. If the court assumes that pain is an impairment rather than
a symptom, it must either accept the inadequacies of medical
science or ignore the requirements of the Act. In most of these
cases, the existence of a medically determinable source impairment is clear from the record." 5 By recognizing the sourcesymptom distinction, the courts could have reached the same
criticism for ignoring the
result without subjecting themselves t;o
Act's specific requirement of medical determinability.
Whichever approach is taken to the problem of medical determinability, short of adopting the Secretary's requirement of objective proof of both the source and the existence of pain, the
question of whether the claimant in each case is in fact disabled
by the alleged pain remains unanswered.

B. CAN PAIN ITSELF BE DISABLING?
In the first few years of the Act's operation, the Secretary
successfully argued that, although pain might make earning a
living more difficult, it is one of the burdens of life which must
be endured." 6 Pain could not be disabling in and of itself unless
the only jobs claimant could perform not only caused him pain,
but also substantially aggravated his condition. This argument
guides, however, and are not binding on the courts. Marion v.
Gardner, 359 F.2d 175, 191 (8th Cir. 1966).
114. See Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1964). In Mode v.
Celebrezze, 359 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966), the court almost made the
source-symptom distinction, but it required that the symptom be "clini-

cal" and "be shown to exist." It is unclear from the opinion just how
the court thought that a "clinical symptom" of the claimant's existing
arthritis, i.e., pain, had been "shown to exist." The court, pointing out
the unfairness of denying benefits "merely because no machine has
been invented to calibrate pain or to determine precisely its incapacitating effects upon different individuals," went on, however, to apply
the Underwood criteria for the determination of the effects of the pain

on the claimant.
115. See, e.g., Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1964) (slipped
disc in neck and rapidly worsening arthritis).
116. See, e.g., Adams v. Flemming, 276 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir.
1960); Hallard v. Flemming, 167 F. Supp. 205, 209 (W.D. Ark. 1958).
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was based on Judge Learned Hand's opinion construing the disability definition of the War Risk Insurance Act in Theberge v.
United States.11"7 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals led the way
in rejecting this argument in Butler v. Flemming,1 8 saying:
....

Judge Learned Hand's statements ...

concerning a

different statute enacted for a different policy in a different
era are [relevant] ... we regard them as contrary to the standKerner [v. Flemming].... [T]he purard announced in...
pose of much social security legislation is to ameliorate some of
these rigors that life imposes. Congress has in effect stated
that if a person is unable except under great pain to engage in
any substantial gainful activity in which he might be employable, taking into consideration his age, training, work experience and physical and mental capacities, he shall be deemed
to be disabled for the purposes of this act.119

Several courts have since expressly adopted the Butler rejection
of the Theberge standard, 120 while none of the others have continued to apply the strict Theberge rule. Several of the latter
have simply stated that assorted pain in and of itself is not necessarily disabling. 12' Thus, they implicitly admit that pain
can be disabling, while holding that it had not been so proven

in the case before them.
C. PROOF OF DisABmrr

The Secretary must determine whether the pain does in fact
exist and, if it does, what its effects are on the claimant. The
court in Underwood v. Ribicoff 122 set out the four kinds of evi-

dence which the Secretary must consider in making these determinations. They are (1) objective medical facts, (2) medical
opinion, (3) the claimant's subjective testimony, and (4) the
87 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1937).
A man may have to endure discomfort or pain and not be
totally disabled; much of the best work of life goes on under
such disabilities; if the insurance had been against suffering, it
would have read so. The only work available to the insured
must do more than hurt, it must substantially aggravate his
malady.
Id. at 698.
118. 288 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1961).
119. Id. at 595. It has, however, been pointed out that the disability definition of the War Risk Insurance Act was not substantially
different from the Social Security Act definition. Henry v. Celebrezze, [1962-1963 Transfer Binder] IA CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INS. REP.
g 14,957 (M.D. Tenn. 1963); Randall v. Flenming, 192 F. Supp. 111, 123
(W.D. Mich. 1961).
120. Eg., Gardner v. Brian, 369 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1966); Henninger v. Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1965); McKerron v. Celebrezze, 236 F.Supp. 382 (D. Mont. 1964).
121. E.g., Easttam v. Secretary, 364 F.2d 509, 513 (8th Cir. 1966).
122. 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962).
117.
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claimant's age, training, and experience.123 The Secretary may
not rely on any one of these four categories to the exclusion of
the others.
As previously mentioned, it is often very difficult to determine the existence and effects of pain by use of objective medical
facts. There are only a few useful clinical or laboratory tests
for the existence and effects of pain, and even these are subject
to criticism on their effectiveness and accuracy. 124 Since each
person's reaction to and tolerance of pain differs, various courts
have held that pain cannot be measured by objective standards. 125
These courts have reversed or remanded administrative denials of
benefits which were based on observable manifestations of the
existence and effects of pain such as the claimant's ability to
articulate a limb through an arc, 126 failure to lose weight and
appetite, 127 and absence of change in bone and muscle structure.128 Thus, the utility of objective medical evidence in disability determinations has been severely limited.
There has been much controversy about the role of medical
opinion evidence in disability determinations.129 The notorious
untrustworthiness of the medical opinions of a claimant's personal physician led to the inclusion of an administrative determination of disability within the framework of the Act.13 0 Congress gave the Secretary responsibility for answering the ultimate question of whether the claimant is disabled. The Underwood case merely recognized that he is bound to consider the
diagnoses and expert medical opinions of the treating and examining physicians on subsidiary questions of fact.' 3 ' Some courts,
however, have concluded that a medical opinion that the claimant is disabled is conclusive, absent any objective findings or
123. Id. at 851.
124.

See L.

& H. LIEBENSON, DISABILITY EVALUATION IN PER119-20 (1962); A Re-Evaluation of the Subjective

MILLER
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Symptom:

Objective Versus Subjective Medical Evidence, CURRENT
at 38-39.
125. See, e.g., Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1964).
126. Brown v. Gardner, 251 F. Supp. 770 (D.S.C. 1966).
127. Ihnen v. Gardner, 253 F. Supp. 541 (D.S.D. 1966).
128. Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1964).
129. See Palmer, Medical Evaluation of Impairment-Not Disability,
16 VA-D L. REv. 1107 (1963). The American Medical Association has
recognized the difference between impairments and disability. The
A.M.A. has concluded that the rating of disability might be better
handled by persons or bodies outside the medical profession due to the
sociological, occupational, and financial considerations involved in the
concept of disability.
MED., Nov. 1961,

130.

gee 98 CONG.

REC.

5473 (1952).

131. 298 F.2d 850, 851 (4th Cir. 1962).
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medical opinion to the contrary in the record. 1 32 The Act requires that the claimant's impairment be medically determinable.
It is only on that question, therefore, that the Secretary should
be required to defer completely to medical opinion. The Act
does not require that the claimant's disability be medically determinable. If such were the case, there would be little need for
an administrative determination of disability, since the opinion
of one or more physicians that the claimant is disabled would be
conclusive. The question of disability under the Act's definition
is, however, a complex medico-legal problem involving personal,
economic, and vocational factors, as well as medical considerations, all of which must be taken into account. The administrator,
in constantly dealing with the problem, develops some measure of
expertise in evaluating and integrating these factors. While the
Secretary should not be permitted to ignore medical opinion, he
should not be inextricably bound by it. On the ultimate question
of statutory disability, the agency should be free to make a decision based on all of the available evidence, taking full advantage
of the expertise it has developed.
When there is a conflict in the medical opinion evidence, the
courts have usually upheld the Secretary's decision. 133 The administrative process was created specifically to allow for expert
determinations when there are conflicts in the evidence. Recently, however, the Fourth Circuit has twice refused to sustain
decisions by hearing examiners which were adverse to the claimant in cases involving a conflict of medical opinion. 3 4 In both
cases the claimant's physician testified that the claimant was
disabled. In Hayes v. Gardner,35 testimony to the contrary
came from an agency physician who had never examined the
claimant, but who based his opinion on the medical records submitted by the claimant. In Skeens v. Gardner, 36 however, a physician examined the claimant for the purpose of giving evidence
at the hearing and concluded that he was not disabled. In each
case the court held that, in view of the objective medical evidence

132. See Sayres v. Gardner, IA CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INs. REP.
14,815 (6th Cir. 1967); Sisk v. Gardner, 1A CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INs.
REP. 14,663 (N.D. Ala. 1966) (unavailability of medical records not the
fault of claimant).
133. E.g., Vineyard v. Gardner, 376 F.2d 1012 (8th Cir. 1967);
Aldridge v. Celebrezze, 339 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1964); Celebrezze v. Bolas,
316 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1963).
134. Skeens v. Gardner, 377 F.2d 405 (4th Cir. 1967); Hayes v.
Gardner, 376 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1967).
135. 376 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1967).
136. 377 F.2d 405 (4th Cir. 1967).
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of disability provided by the claimant's work history and by the
testimony of the claimant's physician, as well as the claimant's
subjective testimony, 3 7 the testimony of one physician that the
claimant was not disabled did not constitute substantial evidence
to support the Secretary's denial of benefits. Thus, not only did
the court accept medical opinion on disability rather than on impairment, but it also substituted its judgment for that of the Secretary regarding which of the conflicting medical opinions should
prevail. At least in cases such as Skeens, where both physicians
have examined the claimant, such a substitution is unjustified.
If the testimony of the claimant's personal physician is always
to prevail, little has been accomplished by the establishment of
an administrative process for disability determinations.
Since some courts have rejected objective clinical and laboratory fact as unreliable and inconclusive in determining the
existence or effects of pain, and since medical opinion evidence
is not always reliable or conclusive, the subjective testimony of
the claimant has taken on great importance. It is clear from
the legislative history of the Act that Congress was trying to
preclude a claimant from coming in and saying, "I hurt, pay
me!" 13 8 Some courts, however, in their zeal to further the remedial goals of the Act, have held that absent other conflicting
evidence, the claimant's corroborated, subjective testimony may
be enough. 39 Congress, in creating the complex administrative
process, envisioned the Secretary as an expert finder of fact,
whose function should be to assess the credibility of the claimant's testimony concerning his alleged pain. 40
The administrator sees and hears the testimony of the claimant and of all the other witnesses. He is, therefore, in the best
position to determine their credibility. The reviewing court,
137. In Skeens, the court pointed out that the claimant had moved
from West Virginia to Connecticut to get work when the mine in which
he had been working closed. They concluded that this was evidence
that he was not malingering. The court, however, dismissed the evidence showing that his family had since returned to West Virginia and
that he had become unable to work shortly thereafter. Thus, the court
took it upon itself to resolve a conflict in the evidence on this matter
also.

138.
H.R.

See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1189, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955);

REP.

No. 1698, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1300,

81st Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1949).
139. See Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962). In
Sisk v. Gardner, 1A CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INs. REP. f 14,663 (N.D. Ala.
1966), the court held that when medical evidence was unavailable
through no fault of the claimant's, his subjective testimony corroborated
by friends and relatives was sufficient.
140. See Goodwin v. Gardner, 250 F. Supp. 454, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
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confronted by the bare, cold record, has no way of observing the
demeanor of the witnesses. Thus, while the Secretary should be
the one to assess credibility, the claimant should be protected
from arbitrariness. Therefore, the Secretary should be required
to state with particularity why he has concluded that any testimony is not credible.
The courts themselves have emphasized various corroborating or rebutting factors which the Secretary should consider in
assessing credibility, e.g., the presence or absence of supporting
testimony by neighbors and relatives,' 4' the claimant's level of
physical activity, 42 the necessity for and use of medication to
alleviate the alleged pain,' 43 and the claimant's psychological reaction to being out of work.14 4 In emphasizing these factors, the
courts have been making their own assessments of credibility, 45
pointing up the factors which support their conclusion. It is
clear, however, that Congress gave the Secretary, as the finder
of fact, the responsibility for determining, based upon all of these
factors, as well as his own experienced personal observation, the
credibility of the claimant's testimony. As long as the Secretary,
in his findings, gives his reasons for dismissing the claimant's
testimony, which are supported by substantial evidence including the Secretary's expert observations, the Secretary's determination should be upheld.
The failure of the courts to defer to the expertise of the
Secretary can perhaps be attributed to two factors: (1) the
sympathy of the courts for the plight of these claimants; and
(2) the intransigence of the administrators in refusing to accept even the minimum standards set out by the courts. The
pitiable state of most of the claimants would provoke the sym141. Mode v. Celebrezze, 359 F.2d 135, 136 (4th Cir. 1966); Sisk v.
Gardner, 1A CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INS. REP. ff 14,663 (N.D. Ala. 1966)
(such corroboratory testimony held to be enough, despite lack of medical evidence).
142. See Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1965) (ability
to drive automobile some distance evidence of no disability).
143. Compare Easttam v. Secretary, 364 F.2d 509, 513 (8th Cir. 1966)
(absence of use of medication supports a denial of benefits), with
Clifton v. Celebrezze, 241 F. Supp. 609, 610 (D.S.C. 1965) (use of pain
killing drugs was evidence of existence of disabling pain).
144. Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1964) (claimant's
emotional distress at being out of work indicates no malingering).
145. This tendency is illustrated by a number of cases reversing the
Secretary's denial of benefits, relying in part on these factors. See,
e.g., Mode v. Celebrezze, 359 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966); Ber v. Celebrezze, 332 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1964); Clifton v. Celebrezze, 241 F. Supp.
609 (E.D.S.C., 1965).
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pathies of even the most hardened judge.1 46 This does not, however, mean that each fits within the definition of disability provided by Congress. The Secretary, through his hearing examiners, has also hurt his own cause in this area by adhering to the
Theberge standard long after it had been rejected by the
courts. 147 This type of attitude tends to color all the administrative proceedings with the tint of arrogance and arbitrariness,
mitigating against deference by the courts.
D.

CONCLUSION

Absent a clarifying amendment to the disability definition
by Congress, the approach most consistent with the words of the
Act, its legislative history, and humanitarian considerations,
seems to be the treatment of pain as a symptom of some underlying physical or mental impairment whose existence must be medically determinable. Given such an impairment, the Secretary
is charged with determining whether pain exists and whether it
has disabled the claimant. Great deference should be shown,
therefore, to the Secretary when he has considered all of the
available evidence and writes a reasoned opinion for his determination based thereon.
IV. PERSONALITY DISORDERS
The third area of recent judicial activity in the disability
field has been in dealing with the impairments which the Secretary has termed "personality disorders.' 48 By regulation, the
Secretary has declared that chronic alcoholism, sexual deviation, or drug addiction, standing alone, can not be disabling within
the meaning of the Social Security Act.149 The Secretary's regulations have, however, been held to be merely interpretive guides
and, therefore, are not binding upon the courts.'5 0
A.

ALCOHOLISM

It has generally been assumed that chronic alcoholism alone
146. See text accompanying note 49 supra. At least one court has
recognized the weight of sympathy in the disability area and has attempted to ignore it. See Brennan v. Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, 254 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1966).
147. See, e.g., Sayres v. Gardner, 1A CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INS.
REP. If 14,815 (6th Cir. 1967); Moncrief v. Gardner, 357 F.2d 651 (5th
Cir. 1966); Miracle v. Celebrezze, 351 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1965).
148. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519(c) (2) (Mi) (1966).
149. Id.
150. Marion v. Gardner, 359 F.2d 175, 181 (8th Cir. 1966); Cox v.
Celebrezze, 240 F. Supp. 1013, 1017 (D. Ore. 1966).
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does not constitute an impairment which can be disabling within
the meaning of the Act. In upholding a denial of benefits, one
court said simply that alcohol addiction is hardly sufficient to
show a disability within the meaning of the Act.151 The Act's
legislative history contains no specific expression of congressional intent concerning the problem of alcoholism. However,
given the generally limited congressional conception of the scope
of the program, it is highly improbable that, had the question
been posed, a majority of the members would have thought that
the disability program would provide benefits for chronic alcoholics based solely on their alcoholism. While this argument is
speculative at best, it reflects the probable reaction of most Congressmen to a program which might well result in the federal
government's providing an income to support a claimant's drinking habit. It also reflects the general public hostility to the alcoholic. This public hostility prevails because alcoholism has been
conceived of as a voluntary, self-induced, and easily remediable
condition. Several courts, consistent with the administrative
regulation,'5 2 have adopted this attitude, holding that alcoholism
cannot be disabling under the Act's definition, since the claimant
could remedy his impairment and regain his ability to engage
simply by abstaining from
in substantial gainful employment
153
the consumption of alcohol.

There is, however, a growing awareness that alcohol consumption is often not totally voluntary with the alcoholic. Although most alcoholics took their first drink voluntarily, many
have become so addicted to alcohol that they cannot stop drinking
of their own volition. Vhile treatment for alcoholism is available, there has in many cases been a notable lack of success in
151. Mays v. Ribicoff, 206 F. Supp. 170 (S.D.W. Va. 1962).
Brasher v. Celebrezze, 340 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1965).

152. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(g) (1966) provides:

See

"An individual will

be deemed not under a disability if, with reasonable effort and safety to
himself, the impairment can be diminished to the extent that the
individual will not be prevented by the impairment from engaging in
any substantial gainful activity." See H.R. REP. No. 1698, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 23 (1954).
153. See, e.g., Sprouse v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va.
1963); Thompson v. Flemming, 188 F. Supp. 123 (D. Ore. 1960). The
Secretary has also relied on the remediability argument to deny benefits in cases in which obesity was a contributing factor to disability.
In Morton v. Gardner, 257 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.W. Va. 1966), the court
stated at 73: "Certainly, if a person is suffering from a self-induced
affliction, that is readily correctable, he should not be considered for
disability; however, speculation as to what theoretically might happen
should not be used as a basis for denial of an otherwise deserving
claim." See Causby v. Celebrezze, 244 F. Supp. 274 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
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effecting a cure.15 4 Thus, the courts should not dismiss a disability claim based on alcoholism by glib references to remediability, but should examine the facts of each individual case relevant to this issue.
Several courts have held, in addition, that the presence of
alcoholism as a substantial contributing factor to a general physical breakdown would not in and of itself negate the possibility
of the total impairment meeting the statutory definition of disability. 5 5 In these cases, arguably, the physicial impairment
caused at least in part by excessive drinking had become so advanced that abstaining from alcohol would not restore the claimant's ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. This is an
effective response to the remediability argument. Also, since
there is no indication in the legislative history that alcoholics
were explicitly excluded from the disability provisions to punish
their antisocial conduct, it would have been unfair to deny
these claimants benefits solely because of the source of their
disability.
In Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 5 6 the court, presumably accepting the argument that alcoholism cannot be disabling, nevertheless granted disability benefits to an alcoholic claimant, holding
that the claimant's alcoholism was the result of his physical
disability and not the cause of it. 1 57 The claimant became an
alcoholic only after the onset of a physical impairment which the
court held was in itself disabling within the meaning of the
Act.5s While the cause of the claimant's alcoholism was irrelevant to the determination of disability in this case, the court's
approach does suggest the following argument. If the claimant
becomes an alcoholic as a result of some medically determinable
impairment, either because of his pain, his embarrassment, or his
despondency concerning the impairment, he might argue that his
alcoholism is merely a symptom of ;he underlying source impairment. Relying on the cases which treat pain as such a symptom, he could then argue that the disabling effects of his alcoholism must be evaluated by means of the four types of evidence
set out in Underwood v. Ribicoff.159 However, as before, if the
154. See M.
LAw 321 (1952).
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155. See, e.g., Cook v. Celebrezze, 233 F. Supp. 295 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
Cf. Hill v. Celebrezze, 233 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
156. 214 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.W. Va. 19133).
157. Id. at 689.
158. Id.
159. 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962). See text accompanying note 124
supra.

1967]

SOCIAL SECURITY

alcoholism is remediable, and if after such a remedy the claimant's impairment would not prevent him from engaging in substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled.
In Lewis v. Celebrezze,160 the court cited a recent criminal
case' 6 in support of its contention that alcoholism is a medically
determinable disease. Assuming this position to be correct, a
claimant might be disabled by alcoholism alone since there is
little doubt that a disease may be an impairment within the
meaning of the Act. The court failed so to argue, confusing instead the terms "disability" and "impairment," and saying that
where chronic alcoholism alone or in combination with other
causes is shown to have resulted in a medically determinable
disability rendering gainful employment impossible, recovery of
benefits under the Act ought not to be barred on account of the
origin of the disability. 6 2 The Act does not require that the
claimant's disability be medically determinable. Rather, it requires the impairment which causes the disability to be medically determinable. Although it is hard to determine what the
Lewis court is actually saying, future claimants are provided
with the argument that alcoholism is a medically determinable
impairment which, standing alone, may result in disability.
While Congress at the time of the Act's passage may not have
conceived of alcoholism as a medically determinable impairment,
it did write the status of medical science into the Act. Therefore
insofar as chronic alcoholism is recognized today as a medically
determinable impairment, and insofar as voluntary abstinence
from alcohol has become impossible or ineffective, a claimant
who is precluded from engaging in substantial gainful activity
by chronic alcoholism should be entitled to disability benefits.
B.

THE Marion CASE

The most interesting recent decision in the area of personality disorders is Marion v. Gardner.'63 The claimant, an habitual
homosexual, had been committed to a state hospital under the
Minnesota Psychopathic Personality Act. 164 The Eighth Circuit,
long a relatively strict court in the disability field, had no hesitancy or difficulty in reversing the Secretary's denial of benefits
or in relating the applicant's predicament to the threefold re160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

359 F.2d 398 (4th Cir. 1966).
Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
359 F.2d at 400 (dicta).
359 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1966).
Mum. STAT. §§ 526.09-.11 (1965).
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quirement of the federal statute.165 Since the claimant was confined under a statute which states that he should be treated as
insane, 66 the court rightly concluded that he had a mental impairment. 67 Further, since his commitment was based upon
findings in which physicians participated and concurred, his
impairment was medically determinable. 6 Despite the claimant's skills as a salesman, he needed such strict supervision because of his assaultive tendencies tha rare indeed, and perhaps
even nonexistent, would be a reputable employer who would
hire him. 69 Therefore, the court found that he was realistically
70
unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.
The court was extremely careful, however, not to invalidate
the personality disorder regulation in toto. -Instead it was treated
as a general guide and not a complete barrier to a sexual deviant's qualification under the statute 71 The court emphasized
that it was confining its holding to the facts of this case, and did
not intend to equate homosexuality with disability, since many
homosexuals are able to engage in substantial gainful employment. 7 2 The court also pointed out that while judicially ordered
incarceration or hospitalization ordinarily does prevent one from
working, it cannot be considered to be a disability unless all of
73
the other statutory requirements are met.
The court deemed irrelevant the question whether the claimant's homosexuality was thought of as self-caused or externally
imposed, so long as his impairment met the Act's definition of
disability. 74 This argument could also be used to meet the
objections to granting disability benefits to alcoholics on the
grounds that their impairment is self-induced.
The basic rationale of the Marion court might well be applicable to those claimants classified as "inebriates" under Minnesota law, which defines an "inebriate" as "any person incapable of managing himself or his affairs by reason of the habitual
and excessive use of intoxicating liquors, narcotics or other
drugs.' 75 If the claimant meets this definition he may be com165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

359 F.2d at 181.
MIN1 . STAT. §

526.10 (1965).

359 F.2d at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182.
Id.
Id.
MuN. STAT. § 253.32(4) (1967).
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mitted to a state or private institution. 176 The statute provides
for an examination of the alleged inebriate for which "the court
must appoint two licensed physicians and, in addition, may appoint a person skilled in the ascertainment of mental deficiency.' 77 Thus, there is little doubt that the inebriate would
be suffering from a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment, for if he is institutionalized, there must have been
a finding by the court that he is incapable of managing himself
or his affairs by reason of this impairment. 178 The inebriate
claimant under the Marion rationale has, therefore, a good case
for disability benefits. He could be denied benefits only if the
Secretary were able to prove by substantial evidence that, although the claimant is incapable of managing his own affairs, he
is able to engage in substantial gainful activity.
The Marion court specifically reserved judgment concerning
the effect of the claimant's future release upon his disability
benefits. 1'7 9 If such benefits are limited to institutionalized, disordered personalities, a great inequity develops. The institutionalized, disordered personality is already receiving care for his
basic needs from the state. 180 Since alcoholism, sexual deviation, and drug addiction can be considered medically determinable impairments, either by implication from such a statute or
by reference to modern medical opinion, the uninstitutionalized,
disordered personality, whose condition and record may just as
conclusively preclude him from employment, but who is not
dangerous to himself or society should not be denied such benefits, for he has an even greater need for disability payments than
his institutionalized counterpart. These relative equities should
not fail to impress a court which bases its decision on fairness
and the remedial nature of the Act.
Should it come to pass, such a de facto overruling of the
personality disorder regulations would mark a significant expansion of the concept of disability, not only over prior practice,
but also over the most probable interpretation of congressional
intent in formulating the concept. While Congress did not specifically consider the problems of sexual deviation or drug addiction in relation to the disability definition, had the problem been
§ 253.37(17) (a) (1967).
§ 253.37(2) (1967).
§ 253.32(4) (1967).
178.
179. 359 F.2d at 182.
180. While an institutionalized claimant may not need disability
benefits for himself, the dependents' benefits provided by the Act may
be desperately needed by his dependents.
176. Mine.

STAT.
STAT.
MINN.STAT.

177. MnN.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:165

posed, there is little doubt that the vast majority of members
would not have favored social security benefits for such disorders. On the other hand, if these personality disorders are
conceived of by the medical profession as mental or physical
impairments, the existence of which. can be medically determined, if they are determined not to be readily remediable, and
if they preclude the individual claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity, they meet the literal requirements of
the Act's definition of disability, and. claimants suffering from
them are entitled to disability benefits.
V. CONCLUSION
The present state of the law concerning the disability provisions of the Social Security Act is far from satisfying. The
federal courts are divided on each of the three major questions
in interpreting the Act. Thus, whether or not a claimant receives disability benefits may well depend more upon where he
lives than upon his impairment, residual capacities, age, training,
and experience. The federal court system is designed so that
such purely geographical disparities can be overcome, yet the Supreme Court has not chosen to do so. While some of the courts
have engaged in thoughtless expansion of the program simply
because it is "remedial," the Secretary has often refused to capitulate to even the most reasonable and humane interpretations of the disability program. 181 The statutory language and
the legislative history provide the Secretary with a strong mandate to deny benefits to nonconforming claimants, yet the equities in favor of the claimant in any given case are often very
strong. This puts an almost unbearable strain upon the efficient
administration of the social security disability program. Congress, by clarifying its position on the burden of proof, area
availability, pain, and personality disorders, could end this
geographical inequity and judicial-administrative cold warfare.
While it would seem that the great diversity of judicial treatment of the disability definition might encourage congressional
action, it may be having the opposite effect. If this is true, we
must rely on the courts for a solution.
Congress has provided a definition of disability under which
benefits are to be granted only if a covered worker is effectively
retired from the labor force by a medically determinable physi181.

See text accompanying note 147 supra.
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cal or mental impairment. It has also provided that the burden
of proving these facts is on the claimant. Therefore, it is only by
careful and reasonable statutory construction, in light of the
legislative history of the Act, and the role of the Secretary in
administering disability determinations, that the courts can give
a meaningful, uniform interpretation to the disability program.

